Post-Verdict Motion Practice after \u3cem\u3eFuesting v. Zimmer\u3c/em\u3e by Proesel, Christopher
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 4 
9-1-2006 
Post-Verdict Motion Practice after Fuesting v. Zimmer 
Christopher Proesel 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher Proesel, Post-Verdict Motion Practice after Fuesting v. Zimmer, 2 Seventh Circuit Rev. 87 
(2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/4 
This Civil Procedure is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 87
POST-VERDICT MOTION PRACTICE AFTER 
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Justice Frankfurter once called the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure “the product of the progress of centuries from the medieval 
court-room contest—a thinly disguised version of trial by combat—to 
modern litigation.”1 Their purpose is to ensure a quick and efficient 
disposition of a lawsuit while placing all litigants on an equal playing 
field and promoting overall fairness.2 For example, judicial efficiency 
can often be served by affording the trial court an opportunity to 
correct a case absent appeal.3 A court’s rules should certainly 
encourage attorneys to practice in a manner that best promotes judicial 
economy. However, compliance with these rules does not always 
require the “better practice.” Indeed, such a requirement may 
undermine the parallel goal of the rules to promote just results. After 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 62 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and are approved by Congress. 
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that the rules “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action”). 
3  See infra note 52. 
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all, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the Field Code and 
common law pleadings primarily because of the formality and 
harshness of the latter two systems.  
Recently, in Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a verdict-losing litigant must file a 
post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 
50(b) in order for a court of appeals, based on the legal sufficiency of 
the evidence, to either enter judgment for that litigant or order a new 
trial.4 This requirement promotes judicial efficiency by allowing the 
trial court to correct a case, which should not be submitted to the jury 
because of the legal insufficiency of the evidence, without having the 
parties go through an appeal process that could lead to a new trial. 
However, according to the Seventh Circuit, harmless error review of a 
trial court’s evidentiary ruling differs distinctly from review of the 
sufficiency of evidence, and, thus, is permitted even though an 
appellant did not move for judgment as a matter of law after the jury’s 
verdict. While the “best practice” may be to require the post-verdict 
motion for the same reasons as in Unitherm, such a requirement is not 
necessary in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a), which, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, “make[s] clear that a party is not 
required to renew an objection to an evidentiary motion in order to 
preserve its right to appeal.”5 
A review of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 jurisprudence and 
of the purpose and meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 103 reveals 
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fuesting v. Zimmer6 is correct. 
The purpose of this Note is to expand on the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Fuesting in order to provide the attorneys practicing in 
federal courts with a detailed interpretation of Unitherm’s effect on an 
appellant’s ability to seek a new trial on appeal based on a claim of 
evidentiary error. 
                                                 
4 126 S.Ct. 980, 989 (2006). 
5 Id. at 940 (reasoning that a “preserved claim of error on appeal is meaningless 
if the court of appeals, handcuffed by Rule 50, has no authority to award relief”). 
6 (“Fuesting II”) 448 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Specifically, this Note will argue, as did the Fuesting panel, that 
satisfaction of Rule 103(a)’s conditions is sufficient, by itself, to give 
the court of appeals the power to grant a new trial where the trial court 
engaged in prejudicial error. In order to reach this conclusion, Part I 
first discusses the various court rules that are at play here—Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59, and Federal Rule of Evidence 
103. Next, Parts II and III relay the facts and reasoning of both the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Unitherm and the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Fuesting, respectively. Lastly, Part IV analyzes Fuesting in 
three ways: (a) by directly confronting a “subtle tension” recognized 
by the Seventh Circuit panel7 and demonstrating that an appellate 
court’s lack of power, after Unitherm, to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence absent a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law 
does not preclude the court from engaging in harmless error review; 
(b) by surveying the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence extracting the 
appropriate procedures under Rule 50 and determining that the 
underlying policies of those decisions are not relevant to a situation in 
which a party seeks a new trial on appeal based upon evidentiary error; 
and (c) by contending that the Supreme Court, in amending Rule 
103(a), implicitly determined that not affording the trial court an 
opportunity to correct its mistaken rulings does not preclude a party 
from seeking relief on appeal. 
 
I. BACKGROUND – THE RULES 
 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 
 
 The Supreme Court promulgated Rule 50 in order to speed up 
litigation and to prevent unnecessary retrials without sacrificing full 
and fair consideration of the issues raised by litigants.8 The rule does 
not alter the common law right of litigants to request that the trial 
                                                 
7 Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 939. 
8 See Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 56 (1952); Montgomery 
Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 250 (1940). For a more detailed review of the 
constitutionality of Rule 50, see 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2522 (2d ed. 1995). 
3
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court reserve a question of law and take “verdicts subject to the 
ultimate ruling on the questions reserved.”9 Indeed, it still allows 
courts to remove issues from the jury’s consideration “when the facts 
are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular result.”10 Rather, 
Rule 50 merely simplifies the process of raising and preserving this 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence, a legal question to be 
decided by the trial court.11 Because this common law right to have 
courts reserve questions of law during jury trials has been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court to be consistent with the Seventh Amendment, 
Rule 50 does not run afoul of a party’s constitutional right to a trial by 
jury.12 
Essentially, Rule 50 codifies the motion for a directed verdict and 
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.13 A litigant can 
now move for “judgment as a matter of law” at any time before 
submission of the case to the jury, but only after the other party has 
been fully heard on the issue.14 If the trial court finds that “there is no 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the 
                                                 
9 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659 (1935). 
10 9A WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 8, § 2521; Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 
440, 447 (2000). 
11 See Montgomery Ward, 311 U.S. at 250; 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 
2521.  
12 See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659. In a later case stating the constitutionality of 
Rule 50(b) specifically, the Supreme Court, while primarily holding that Redman 
controlled, also relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which it considered “broad enough to 
include the power to direct entry of judgment [as a matter of law] on appeal.” Neely 
v. Martin K. Eby Constr.  Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967).  
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 50. Indeed, the original version of the rule included these 
terms in its language. However, in 1991 the Supreme Court amended the rule to give 
both motions the common name of “motion for judgment as a matter of law.” The 
purposes of the change were to adopt names that better describe the role of the 
motions and to give both motions a common name because the same standard 
applies to both of them. See id., Advisory Committee Note to 1991 Amendments. 
Throughout this paper, I periodically use the terms directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, because they are still very much a part of the trial 
lawyer’s vocabulary. 
14 Id. at 50(a)(2). 
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non-moving] party,” it may enter judgment for the movant on that 
issue.15 Or, in its discretion, the court may deny the motion and submit 
the issue to the jury.16 By so doing, the court is considered to have 
reserved its decision on this question of law until after the jurors return 
a verdict or reach impasse.17 At that point, the movant may renew its 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and “may alternatively request 
a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.”18 If the 
party does so move, the trial court may rule one of three ways: it can 
enter judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or set aside the jury’s 
verdict and enter judgment as a matter of law for the movant.19  
 
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
 
 Rule 59 allows the trial court to grant a new trial for any of the 
reasons for which new trials have traditionally been granted in actions 
at law in U.S. courts.20 Parties most commonly base their motions for 
a new trial on the verdict being against the weight of the evidence, the 
damages being excessive, or the trial court committing a prejudicial 
error of law.21 New trials are also granted because the trial was not fair 
in light of newly discovered evidence22 or the misconduct of jurors, 
                                                 
15 Id. at 50(a)(1). 
16 See id; Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 980, 988–
89 (2006). 
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
18 Id. Subsections (c) and (d) go into more detail regarding the procedure for 
when the two motions are made in the alternative. See infra Part IV(B). 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). Of course, this first option is not available if the jury 
does not return a verdict, as subsection (b)(2) points out. 
20 Id. at 59(a). 
21 See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 2805; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. 
Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). 
22 See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, §2808 (noting that the motion will only 
be granted if the new evidence is of facts existing at time of trial, new evidence is 
admissible and probably effective to change the result of the original trial, and 
movant is “excusably ignorant of the facts”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). 
5
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judges, or counsel.23 Also, Rule 59 permits the trial court to order, on 
its own initiative, a new trial “for any reason that would justify 
granting one on a party’s motion.”24 A U.S. district court has the power 
to weigh evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and it has 
discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to the court to be 
against the weight of the evidence.25  
 
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 103 
 
 In 1975 the Supreme Court created and adopted the Federal Rules 
of Evidence “to secure fairness in administration, elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence.”26 Rule 103(a) was not a 
groundbreaking pronouncement but rather stated the law as generally 
accepted at the time.27 It prohibited a court of appeals from reversing a 
trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence unless “a 
substantial right of the party is affected”28 and unless the following is 
satisfied: 
 
Objection.—In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears 
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
 
Offer of Proof.—In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made 
known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked. 
 
                                                 
23 See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 2809–10. 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d). 
25 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958). 
26 FED. R. EVID. 102.  
27 See id. at 103, Advisory Committee Note for 1972 Proposed Rules. 
28 Id. at 103(a); see infra Part IV(A). 
6
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But, even if a party does not object to errors at trial, the district court 
may take notice of “plain errors” that affect the substantial rights of 
the party.29 
 The most recent and interesting development in the rule came 
with the 2000 addition of the proviso at the end of subsection (a). It 
reads: “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record 
admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial,30 a party 
need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of 
error for appeal.”31 Before this amendment the courts of appeals took 
at least three different approaches in determining “whether a losing 
party must renew an objection or offer of proof when the evidence is 
or would be offered at trial, in order to preserve a claim for error on 
appeal.”32 The approaches ranged from always requiring a renewal,33 
to distinguishing between objections to evidence and offers of proof,34 
to only requiring a renewal in certain situations.35 
 It is clear from the language of the 2000 amendment that the 
Supreme Court has adopted the third approach and only requires a 
party to renew an objection or offer of proof when the trial court does 
not make a definitive ruling on the record.36 However, although a 
definitive ruling preserves a party’s claim of error for appeal, an 
appellate court will only review that ruling “in light of the facts and 
                                                 
29 FED. R. EVID. 103(d).  
30 This Note focuses on rulings before trial, because such a ruling was at issue 
in Fuesting. 
31 Id. at 103(a). If the error was not adequately preserved at or before trial, a 
court of appeals cannot reverse the trial court unless the error was plain. Id. at 
103(d). 
32 Id., Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment. 
33 See id. (citing Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
34 See FED. R. EVID. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment 
(citing Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
35 See FED. R. EVID. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment 
(citing Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, 78 F.3d 84 (2d. Cir. 1996)). 
36 See FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
7
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circumstances before the trial court at the time of the ruling.”37 An 
appellant cannot rely upon any facts that have materially changed 
since the advance ruling was made, unless it brings them to the 
attention of the district court in a renewed objection or offer of proof.38 
 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN  
UNITHERM FOOD SYSTEMS, INC. V. SWIFT-ECKRICH, INC. 
 
In Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.39 the U.S. 
Supreme Court added to its jurisprudence interpreting Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50. 
In 2000, Unitherm Food Systems sought a declaration from an 
Oklahoma federal court that ConAgra Food’s patent40 on its process 
for browning precooked meats was invalid, and further “alleged that 
ConAgra had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act . . . by attempting to 
enforce a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office.”41 After finding the patent invalid, the district court allowed 
the § 2 claim to proceed to trial.42 Prior to jury deliberations, ConAgra 
moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), for the 
court to direct a verdict in its favor due to the evidence being legally 
insufficient to support a verdict to the contrary.43 After the court 
denied the motion, the jury decided in Unitherm’s favor, and ConAgra 
appealed the decision without either renewing its motion for judgment 
as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) or moving for a new trial under 
                                                 
37 Id., Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment. (citing Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 n.6 (1997) (instructing reviewing courts to 
“evaluate the trial court's decision from its perspective when it had to rule and not 
indulge in review by hindsight”)). 
38 See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182. 
39 Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,126 S.Ct. 980 (2006). 
40 ConAgra Foods, Inc. is the parent company of Swift-Eckrich, Inc. and is 
referred to in this Note as the respondent in Unitherm. 
41 Id. at 983–84. 
42 Id. at 984. 
43 Id. 
8
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Rule 59.44 On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with ConAgra that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove the legal elements of antitrust 
liability; so, it vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial.45 The 
Supreme Court, however, determined that the Federal Circuit could 
not remand for a new trial because, without a post-verdict motion by 
ConAgra, it did not have the power to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence before the jury.46 In other words, the court of appeals was 
powerless to act on appeal, so the jury verdict endured.47 
The Supreme Court justified its decision as consistent with the 
text and application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
recognizing judicial efficiency as a key policy concern, and, simply, as 
fair. The Court required the post-verdict motion, because determining 
whether to grant a new trial or enter a judgment as a matter of law 
“‘calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and 
heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate 
printed transcript can impart.’”48 Furthermore, the denial of the pre-
verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law cannot form the basis 
for review, because denial of that motion is not error, but rather an 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. The Federal Circuit has previously held that the appellant’s failure to file 
a post-verdict motion in the district court precludes the appellate court from 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, 
Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1991). However, in Unitherm, it was bound to 
apply the regional circuit law—in this case, the Tenth Circuit—which allowed such 
review where the appellant did file a pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion. See Cummings 
v. General Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2004). Hence, in 
Unitherm, the Supreme Court settled an inter-circuit split on the issue of whether a 
court of appeals could grant judgment as a matter of law where the appellant had not 
filed a Rule 50(b) motion at the trial court level. 
46 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 987. The Federal Circuit could only order a new trial 
on antitrust liability if ConAgra filed a Rule 59 motion after the verdict. Similarly, it 
could only enter judgment for ConAgra, if the food company had renewed its pre-
verdict motion as specified in Rule 50(b). 
47 See id. at 989. 
48 Id. at 985–86 (quoting Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 
(1947)). 
9
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exercise of the trial court’s discretion.49 Rule 50(a) merely permits the 
district court to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if the 
court determines that “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis 
for a reasonable jury to find for [the non-moving] party.”50 It does not 
require the court to grant the motion.51 Indeed, the Court suggested 
that it is usually more efficient for trial courts to submit the case to the 
jury.52 Lastly, the Court does not consider the filing of timely motions 
to be artificial requirements. Rather, they are essential parts of certain 
federal rules of procedure, “‘firmly grounded in principles of 
fairness.’”53 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Unitherm, if an 
appellant does not timely file a Rule 50(b) motion, a court of appeals 
will lack the power to determine whether the evidence evinced at trial 
was legally sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for the appellee.54 
                                                 
49 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 988-89. 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). 
51 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 988. 
52 Id. at 988–89. This point is illustrated by Professor Wright in his popular 
treatise on federal practice and procedure: 
If judgment as a matter of law is granted and the appellate court holds that 
the evidence in fact was sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new trial 
must be had. If, on the other hand, the trial court submits the case to the 
jury, though it thinks the evidence insufficient, final determination of the 
case is expedited greatly. If the jury agrees with the court's appraisal of 
the evidence, and returns a verdict for the party who moved for judgment 
as a matter of law, the case is at an end. If the jury brings in a different 
verdict, the trial court can grant a renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. Then if the appellate court holds that the trial court was in 
error in its appraisal of the evidence, it can reverse and order judgment on 
the verdict of the jury, without any need for a new trial. For this reason 
the appellate courts repeatedly have said that it usually is desirable to take 
a verdict, and then pass on the sufficiency of the evidence on a post-
verdict motion. 
9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 2533. 
53 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 986 (quoting Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 
U.S. 48, 53 (1952)). 
54 See Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 987. In dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that 28 
U.S.C. § 2106 permitted the court of appeals to consider the sufficiency of the 
10
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Furthermore, if a Rule 59 motion is also not made, the court of appeals 
has no power to grant any relief to the appellant seeking a directed 
verdict or a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence.55 
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FUESTING V. ZIMMER, INC. 
 
In a case with the same procedural posture as Unitherm but where 
the appellant sought a new trial on appeal based on evidentiary error at 
trial and not insufficiency of the evidence, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Unitherm and remanded the case for a new trial.56 
In 2002, plaintiff Fuesting sued Zimmer, Inc. in an Illinois federal 
court for negligently manufacturing his prosthetic knee.57 Before trial, 
Zimmer moved in limine, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to 
exclude the testimony of Fuesting’s expert witness.58 The trial court 
                                                                                                                   
evidence despite the appellant’s failure to file the Rule 50(b) motion. Id. at 989–90 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). § 2106 permits a federal appellate court to: 
[A]ffirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the 
cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, 
or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances. 
Although the Court has recognized the broad grant of authority in this statute, it has 
made clear that this authority must be exercised “consistent with the requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by [the] Court.” Id. at 986 
(majority opinion); see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
55 See id. at 988. 
56 Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. (Fuesting II), 448 F.3d 936, 941–42 (7th Cir. 
2006). Only one other court of appeals has considered the issue whether Unitherm 
requires a party to file a post-verdict motion in order to seek a new trial on appeal 
based on an erroneous evidentiary error by the trial court. The First Circuit agrees 
with the Seventh Circuit’s assessment. See Vazquez-Valentin v. Santiago-Diaz, 459 
F.3d 144, 146 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006) (Unitherm does not mean that a party has to file a 
post verdict motion in order to preserve an evidentiary objection on appeal.”). 
However, the First Circuit’s treatment of the issue was dicta and, therefore, offered 
little analysis. 
57 Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 937. 
58 Id. 
11
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denied the motion, and the expert testified at trial that Zimmer’s air 
sterilization method led to the prosthesis’s premature failure and, 
hence, Fuesting’s injuries.59 After the trial and before the court 
submitted the case to the jury, Zimmer moved for judgment as a matter 
of law under Rule 50(a).60 The trial court denied the motion, and the 
jury later returned a verdict for Fuesting.61 After the verdict, Zimmer 
did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law nor move for 
a new trial.62 However, it did appeal, arguing for a new trial based on 
the trial court’s prejudicial error in allowing plaintiff’s expert to testify 
and based on the trial court’s flawed jury instructions.63 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ruled, pursuant to Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.64 and Rule 702, that the testimony 
of Fuesting’s expert was scientifically unreliable and that the district 
court erred in allowing it to be offered at trial, thereby prejudicing the 
manufacturer’s case.65 Then, having assessed the remaining evidence 
as legally insufficient for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict and ordered the district 
court to enter judgment for Zimmer.66 Subsequently, Fuesting 
petitioned for a rehearing, and the court of appeals stayed 
consideration of the petition until after the Supreme Court decided the 
Unitherm case.67 In its opinion after the rehearing, the Seventh Circuit 
held that Unitherm clearly prohibited it from ordering judgment for 
Zimmer as a matter of law because awarding judgment involves a full 
                                                 
59 Id. at 937–38. 




64 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court developed the criteria 
by which expert testimony should be allowed under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
65 Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. (Fuesting I), 421 F.3d 528, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d in part on reh’g, 448 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2006). While the substance of this 
evidentiary holding may be non-trivial to the development of Daubert jurisprudence, 
this Note is primarily concerned with the procedural posture of the case. 
66 Fuesting I, 421 F.3d at 437. 
67 Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 937. 
12
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examination of the sufficiency of the evidence, which must be 
performed first by the trial court.68 The court, nonetheless, remanded 
the case for a new trial based on the district court’s prejudicially 
erroneous evidentiary ruling.69 Referring to the situation as a “subtle 
tension,” the Seventh Circuit panel reasoned that Unitherm did affect a 
reviewing court’s ability to remand for a new trial based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence but did not affect its power to engage in 
harmless error analysis.70 Indeed, the court admits that “determining 
whether an evidentiary error is harmless necessarily requires some 
weighing of the sufficiency of the evidence.”71 
However, it overcomes this hurdle by gathering the support of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 103, prior precedent, and the scholarship of 
influential commentators.72 First, says the court, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence explain that, once a party objects to the admission or 
exclusion of evidence, it is not required to renew the objection in order 
to preserve its right to appeal, providing the district court made a 
definitive ruling on the record.73 A preserved claim of error on appeal, 
according to court, would be rendered meaningless if an appellate 
court could not review the error because it was “handcuffed” by Rule 
50.74 Secondly, the Seventh Circuit does not believe the Supreme 
Court would have established an expansive rule that makes a post-
verdict motion a prerequisite to appeal without addressing the “the 
substantial body of cases in which courts of appeals have awarded new 
trials purely on the basis of evidentiary errors.”75 Lastly, the court 
invokes the expertise of Charles Wright and James Moore, who agree 
                                                 
68 Id. at 939. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (elaborating later that “[a]n appellate court cannot truly determine 
whether an error was harmless without considering the force of the other evidence 
presented to the jury”). 
72 Id. at 941. 
73 Id. at 940 (interpreting FED. R. EVID. 103(a)). 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
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in their treatises on federal practice that courts of appeals can review 
properly preserved claims of error, even though the appellant had not 




 At first glance, despite the Seventh Circuit’s compelling reasons 
for granting a new trial, the panel’s decision appears at odds with the 
broad language used by Justice Thomas in his majority opinion in 
Unitherm. For example, Justice Thomas states that the “Court’s 
observations about the necessity of a postverdict motion under Rule 
50(b), and the benefits of the district court’s input at that stage, apply 
with equal force whether a party is seeking judgment as a matter of 
law or simply a new trial.”77 And later, after summarizing the relevant 
precedent used to support his view, he remarks that “these outcomes 
merely underscore our holding today—a party is not entitled to pursue 
a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate 
postverdict motion in the district court.”78 
 However, this broad language can and should be limited by the 
remainder of the Court’s opinion that focused entirely on Rule 50, 
which itself is concerned solely with directing verdicts and ordering 
new trials based on the legal sufficiency of the evidence before the 
jury. The Seventh Circuit in Fuesting II correctly distinguishes 
Unitherm on the fact that the defendant manufacturer’s appeal 
requested a new trial based on the prejudicial effect of the trial court’s 
erroneous evidentiary ruling and not on sufficiency of the evidence, 
                                                 
76 Id. at 941. See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
¶ 59.55 (3d ed. 2005) (“A motion for a new trial is not required to preserve properly 
made objections for appellate review, and is therefore not a prerequisite to an appeal 
from the judgment.”); 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 2818 (“[t]he settled rule in 
federal courts . . . is that a party may assert on appeal any question that has properly 
been raised in the trial court. Parties are not required to make a motion for a new trial 
challenging the supposed errors as a prerequisite to appeal.”). 
77 Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 980, 986 (2006). 
78 Id. at 987 (emphasis added). 
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the grounds on which ConAgra sought a new trial in Unitherm.79 A 
court is not asked to consider the sufficiency of the evidence when 
engaging in harmless error review.80 And, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a), affording the 
district court an opportunity to correct its erroneous evidentiary ruling 
is not as important to the judicial process as obtaining the court’s input 
on whether the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to find for 
one of the parties.81 Therefore, an appellant does not need to file a 
post-verdict motion for a new trial under Rule 59 in order to obtain 
relief on appeal. 
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence as a Factor in Harmless Error Analysis 
 
 Unitherm clearly prohibits a court of appeals from evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence, absent a timely filed post-verdict 
motion.82 However, the Seventh Circuit in Fuesting never really 
explored the role that such an evaluation plays in a reviewing court’s 
harmless error analysis. It expressed concern that its examination of 
whether error is harmless or prejudicial involves “what might be 
considered an implicit weighing of the sufficiency of the evidence,” 
but it doesn’t confront this problem directly.83 Rather, the court 
downplays the issue as not too significant because the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and prior precedent clearly, in the court’s view, create a well-
established rule that a post-verdict motion is not required for a court of 
appeals to review a claim of evidentiary error.84 In distinguishing the 
holding in Unitherm from the case before it, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
79 See Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 939. 
80 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963). 
81 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 
Amendment, with Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1997). 
82 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. 980, 989 (2006). 
83 See Fuesting II, 448 F.3d at 939. 
84 See id. at 940 (“Nevertheless, the ability of the court of appeals to award a 
new trial where there is prejudicial evidentiary error is well-established and 
undisturbed by Unitherm.”) (emphasis added). 
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implicitly asserts that review of sufficiency of the evidence and 
harmless error analysis are separate things, but it never says why.85 
Indeed, the two assessments are wholly distinct, and the Supreme 
Court has consistently reminded courts of this.86 In determining in 
Fahy v. Connecticut whether a defendant convicted of painting 
swastikas on a synagogue was prejudiced by the erroneous admission 
of the unconstitutionally obtained can of black paint and paint brush, 
the Court clarified that it was “not concerned here with whether there 
was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been 
convicted without the evidence complained of.”87 Rather, the Court 
focused on whether the exclusion of the evidence could have changed 
the outcome of the trial.88 
The harmless error rule represents a reaction by Congress to the 
past appellate practice of frequently reversing criminal convictions 
based on technical mistakes made at trial that had slight effect on the 
outcome of the trial.89 Today, the statute states that on appeal “the 
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties.”90 It is commonly understood that the error affects the 
substantial rights of a party at trial if it affects the outcome of the 
trial.91 The statute applies to both criminal and civil cases,92 and its 
                                                 
85 See id. at 939. 
86 See Bundy v. Florida, 479 U.S. 894, 894 (1986), (Brennan, J., dissenting), 
cert denied; Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963); Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). 
87 Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86. 
88 Id. at 95. 
89 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757–61 (“So great was the threat of reversal, in 
many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error in 
the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had 
been thus obtained.”); 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 17 (2d ed. 2006). The Kotteakos opinion offers a detailed 
account of the legislative history of the harmless error rule. 328 U.S. at 758–60. 
90 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006).  
91 See U.S. v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 455 (1986). 
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language has since been replicated in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,93 Civil Procedure,94 and Evidence.95 
The harmless error rule is expressed in general terms, because an 
error’s prejudicialness necessarily depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case.96 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
provided courts with some basic guidelines to follow when engaging 
in harmless error analysis.97 First, in response to the appellate courts’ 
previous propensity to “tower” above trials “as impregnable citadels of 
technicality,” the Supreme Court views the harmless error rule as 
urging appellate courts to avoid applying the rules so rigidly when 
their infringement really does not affect the outcome of the trial.98 
Second, the reviewing court should scrutinize the error in relation to 
the entire record of the proceedings, because only then can it assess 
the error’s effect on the trial.99 Thirdly, the court must do this 
“tempered but not governed in any rigid sense of stare decisis by what 
has been done in similar situations.”100 Indeed, reviewing courts must 
decide the harmlessness of error based on the unique circumstances of 
each case, because, for example, the jurors in one trial might place less 
emphasis on evidence than the jurors in a separate but similar trial 
                                                                                                                   
92 But see Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762 (acknowledging that the statute makes no 
distinction between civil and criminal cases, but not interpreting this as meaning the 
same criteria should always be applied to both kinds of cases). 
93 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. 
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 61. 
95 FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
96 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 761 (describing the analysis as “transcending 
confinement by formula or precise rule” and as a matter “for experience to work 
out”). 
97 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 89, § 17 (extracting five general 
guidelines from Kotteakos). 
98 See Kotteakos, at 760–61 (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of 
Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 
222 (1925)); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 89, at § 17. (advising that “the 
message is not to insist on applying the rules for their own sake, but rather to see 
them as tools that can help achieve a fair and just result”). 
99 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762. 
100 Id. 
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would place on the same evidence.101 Nevertheless, some important 
factors can be derived from the decisions of the Supreme Court and 
courts of appeals.102 For example, the amount of interest the jury 
expressed in the evidence, the level of persuasiveness of the evidence, 
the presence of other evidence in the record that defuses the 
prejudicial quality of the erroneously admitted evidence, and the 
inclusion of a jury instruction that cures the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence are all factors that an appellate court should consider when 
engaging in harmless error review.103 Appellate courts also consider 
the amount of persuasiveness of other evidence that addresses the 
same issue as does the improperly admitted evidence, in order to 
determine whether the latter was merely cumulative.104 
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Kotteakos stressed that the question 
is not whether, after removing the improper evidence from the record, 
there remains enough to support the result.105 Rather, the proper focus 
is on the erroneously admitted evidence’s impact upon the decision 
that was reached by a particular trier of fact.106 A reviewing court’s 
role in harmless error review is not to decide whether the jury’s 
decision was correct.107 However, sufficiency of the evidence 
undoubtedly could play a role in deciding an error’s prejudicialness.108 
                                                 
101 Harmless error review is considered so difficult because it requires a court 
to get into the minds of the jurors. “The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done 
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one’s own.” Id. at 764. This is not always 
easy to do when, to the appellate court’s minds, the record leans in favor of one of 
the parties. 
102 The factors relating to errors of admission sometimes vary from those 
relating to errors of exclusion. See Robert W. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions 
and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48, 53–59 (1957). 
This Note focuses on harmless error review pertaining to evidence that was admitted 
since the trial court in Fuesting erroneously admitted evidence. 
103 See Gibbs, supra note 102, 53–57. 
104 See MUELLER, supra note 89, at § 19. 
105 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. 
106 See id. at 764. 
107 Id. at 763. 
108 Id. at 764. 
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After all, if, absent the error, the evidence in the record would have 
been insufficient for the jury to decide otherwise, the appellant simply 
could not have been prejudiced.109 Similarly, supposing the error never 
happened, if the evidence in the record would then have been 
insufficient, as a matter of law, for a reasonable jury to reach the same 
result, the appellant was undeniably prejudiced by the error.110 This is 
all very axiomatic. In fact, one could say that the sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis by itself answers the harmlessness inquiry in such 
situations. 
On the other hand, courts worry much more over situations where 
a reasonable jury could have reached either the same or the opposite 
result, if the trial court did not err.111 After all, harmless error review is 
concerned with the effect of the error on the decision of a specific 
jury,112 whose members are indeed reasonable113 but which, of course, 
is not any reasonable jury. In theory, although an appellate court 
believes that the jury’s decision, absent improperly admitted evidence, 
was nevertheless correct, it must still find prejudicial error and order a 
new trial if the record demonstrates that the same jury would have 
reached a contrary result after a trial in which that evidence was 
excluded.114 If the court affirmed in such a situation, it would be 
denying the losing party its constitutional right to a trial by jury.115 The 
court can only affirm here if the record shows that the jury’s decision 
would not have been affected by the error.116 
But the Supreme Court in Unitherm is concerned with stepping on 
the prerogative of the trial court to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the first instance given its “feel” for the case; not with the 
                                                 
109 See Gibbs, supra note 102, at 61. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764. 
113 Or at least an appellate court assumes so on review. See Goins v. United 
States, 99 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1938). 
114 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764; Gibbs, supra note 102, at 62. 
115 See Gibbs, supra note 102, at 62. 
116 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. 
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jury’s role to decide questions of fact.117 Therefore, it does not invoke 
the more troubling question of the role of sufficiency of the evidence 
analysis in harmless error review, but rather the self-evident results 
described above.118 But this should not strip appellate courts of the 
power to engage in harmless error review when an appellant fails to 
file a Rule 50(b) motion, which necessarily means after Unitherm that 
the court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence.119 Courts of 
appeal consider their appraisal of the sufficiency of the evidence not as 
dispositive of the prejudice question but only as one of the many 
factors upon which they base their conclusion.120 So, even if Unitherm 
does dictate that appellate courts can no longer employ this factor in 
its harmless error analysis, the ability of the courts to engage in that 
analysis should not suffer. For there are a number of factors the court 
can use to determine whether the record shows that the jury might well 
have reacted differently if not for the trial court’s error.121  
 
B. Rule 50 Jurisprudence and the Power of the Courts of Appeal 
 
Unitherm was the most recent decision in a long line of Supreme 
Court cases determining the applicable procedures required by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 since its adoption in 1938.122 Two major 
concerns underlie most of these cases: the importance of (1) providing 
the trial court, which benefits from a first-hand understanding of the 
case, an opportunity to rule on whether to grant judgment as a matter 
                                                 
117 See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 980, 984 
(2006). 
118 See notes 109 & 110 and their accompanying text. 
119 See Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 989. 
120 See Gibbs, supra note 102, at 61–63. 
121 See supra notes 102–104 and their accompanying text. 
122 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. 980 (2006); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 
(2000); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr.  Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967); Johnson v. N.Y., 
N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48 (1952); Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); 
Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948); Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper 
Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 
(1940); Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933). 
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of law or to order a new trial, and (2) protecting the judgment winner’s 
rights when the judgment is set aside on appeal. These concerns, 
however, are not present in an appellate court’s determination of 
whether a trial court’s evidentiary error was prejudicial to the 
appellant. 
In Rule 50 jurisprudence the motion on which the district court 
rules and the theories advanced by the movant determine the appellate 
court’s power upon appeal.123 For example, in Montgomery Ward & 
Co. v. Duncan, where the Supreme Court first determined the 
appropriate procedure under Rule 50(b), the Court held that the Eighth 
Circuit could not order the district court to enter judgment for the 
plaintiff where the district court granted the defendant’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law after the jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff.124 In that case, after the verdict, the defendant had renewed 
his pre-verdict motion for directed verdict based on insufficiency of 
the evidence and, alternatively, moved for a new trial based on 
evidentiary error and excessive damages.125 The district court found 
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove 
negligence and directed a verdict for the defendant without 
considering the arguments advanced in support of the motion for a 
new trial.126 Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the 
defendant was entitled to have the trial judge consider these arguments 
for a new trial, and accordingly remanded the case for a ruling on that 
motion.127 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court heard a number of cases in 
which it emphasized the importance of giving the verdict winner an 
opportunity to invoke the discretion of the trial judge to grant a new 
trial, and did not allow the court of appeals to enter judgment as a 
                                                 
123 Montgomery Ward, 311 U.S. at 250–51 
124 311 U.S. at 255. 
125 Id. at 245–46. 
126 Id. at 246. 
127 Id. at 252, 255; see WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 8, § 2540, for the process 
on appeal when the trial court grants both the motion for judgment as a matter of law 
and the motion for a new trial, grants one and not the other, or grants neither of 
them. 
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matter of law for the verdict loser.128 In Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & 
Paper Co. the verdict-losing defendant did not renew its Rule 50(a) 
motion after the verdict but did move for a new trial based on the trial 
court’s error in admitting certain evidence.129 After the trial court 
denied the Rule 59 motion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment 
entered on the verdict130 and ordered the district court to enter 
judgment for the defendant, because the evidence, excluding that 
prejudicially admitted by the trial court, was insufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff.131 The Supreme Court 
subsequently reversed and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that, 
before a court of appeals can enter judgment as a matter of law for the 
verdict loser, the trial court must be given an opportunity to exercise 
its discretion—with the judge’s first-hand view of the proceedings 
before him—to enter judgment as a matter of law or grant a new 
trial.132 According to the Court, the purpose of Rule 50 was furthered 
by affording the trial judge this “last chance to correct his own errors 
without delay, expense, or other hardships on appeal.”133 
Cases like Cone display the Supreme Court’s concern with 
protecting the rights of a party whose jury verdict has been set aside 
on appeal and who may have legitimate grounds for a new trial—
grounds which should be considered by the district court in the first 
instance because of its “feel” for the case on the whole.134 However, 
the Court makes clear that this concern does not warrant “an ironclad 
                                                 
128 See Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Globe Liquor Co. v. San 
Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948); Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 
(1947).  
129 Cone, 330 U.S. at 213. 
130 A district court’s order denying or granting a motion for a new trial is not 
appealable, save in exceptional circumstances. The denial of the motion is 
reviewable, though, when the movant appeals the judgment entered on the verdict 
for errors of law committed at trial. See Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal 
Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481–85 (1933). 
131 Cone, 330 U.S. at 214. 
132 Id. at 216. 
133 Id. (citing Greer v. Carpenter, 323 Mo. 878, 882 (1929)). 
134 See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 325 (1967). 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 1                           Fall 2006 
 
 109
rule that the court of appeals should never order dismissal or judgment 
for [the] defendant when the plaintiff’s verdict has been set aside on 
appeal.”135 Rather, the court of appeals has the power to do take a 
number of actions when it determines that the trial court erroneously 
denied the verdict loser’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter 
of law. It may, at its discretion, “(1) order a new trial at the verdict 
winner’s request or on its own motion,136 (2) remand the case for the 
trial court to decide whether a new trial or entry of judgment for the 
defendant is warranted, or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter 
of law for the defendant.”137 
Fuesting differs from Montgomery Ward and its progeny in one 
major respect: the court of appeals did not direct judgment for the 
defendant. The plaintiff whose verdict had been set aside on appeal 
was awarded a new trial at which proper rulings would be rendered.138 
Such a result remedies the prejudicial effect of the erroneously 
admitted evidence upon the defendant’s case, without prejudicing the 
plaintiff’s case, which at trial relied on that evidence. In fact, the 
ultimate outcome in Fuesting was the same as that in the cases, like 
Cone, where the appellant did not file a Rule 50(b) motion.139 
However, in those cases, the appellant did move the trial judge after 
the verdict for a new trial.140 The Supreme Court in Unitherm places a 
lot of emphasis on this fact.141 For example in Cone, the Court did not 
                                                 
135 Id. at 326. 
136 The appellee “may bring his grounds for new trial to the trial judge’s 
attention when defendant first makes an n.o.v. motion, he may argue this question in 
his brief to the court of appeals, or he may in suitable situations seek rehearing from 
the court of appeals after his judgment has been reversed.” Id. at 328–29. 
137 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 451–52 (2000). For example, in 
Neely, the appellate court had the power to direct judgment for the verdict-losing 
defendant where the trial court had denied both the defendant’s Rule 50(b) and Rule 
59 motions. 386 U.S. at 319–21. 
138 See Fuesting v. Zimmer (Fuesting II), 448 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2006). 
139 See, e.g., Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947). 
140 Id. at 213. 
141 See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 980, 987 
(2006). 
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allow the appellate court to enter judgment for the verdict loser 
because the district court was not given a chance through a Rule 50(b) 
motion to exercise its discretion to grant judgment as a matter of law 
or, alternatively, order a new trial.142 According to the Court, the trial 
court’s “appraisal of the bona fides of the claims asserted by the 
litigants is of great value in reaching a conclusion as to whether a new 
trial should be granted.”143  
The Supreme Court now reads Cone and the cases like it as 
leading to the conclusion that “a party is not entitled to pursue a new 
trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate postverdict 
motion in the district court.”144 But those cases are interpretations of 
Rule 50, not Rule 59. The Court would have ordered a new trial in 
Cone even if the appellants had not moved for one under Rule 59.145 
The trial court’s “appraisal of the bona fides of the claims” is 
important in deciding whether to grant a new trial under a Rule 50(b) 
motion.146 That is, it is important for the district court, after deciding 
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict, to 
choose in the first instance between entering judgment as a matter of 
law and ordering a new trial—a Rule 50(b) decision—not between 
ordering a new trial or entering judgment on the verdict—a Rule 59 
decision.147 Allowing the district court to decide in the former situation 
protects the party whose jury verdict was set aside on appeal.148 There 
may be situations in which important considerations remain that entitle 
the verdict winner to a new trial.149 A determination of whether these 
considerations exist depends on the intricacies of the case, which the 
                                                 
142 330 U.S. at 215 (emphasizing that the trial court has “discretion to choose 
between the two alternatives” because “there are circumstances which might lead [it] 
to believe that a new trial rather than a final termination of the trial stage of the 
controversy would better serve the ends of justice”). 
143 Id. at 216. 
144 Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 987. 
145 See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 323 (1967). 
146 See Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947). 
147 Cf. Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 987–88. 
148 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). 
149 See Neely, 386 U.S. at 325. 
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trial court is intimately familiar with, and which, therefore, must first 
be passed upon by the trial court.150 If it determines, in its discretion, 
that a new trial should be ordered, the verdict winner is protected 
without prejudicing the verdict loser. If it decides that a retrial is 
unnecessary and judgment should be entered for the verdict loser, the 
verdict winner can appeal this judgment, and the court of appeals can 
review the decision based on a full record and based on the parties’ 
arguments that are focused on the appropriate issues.151 
On the other hand, Fuesting was not concerned with protecting 
the verdict winner. Its verdict was not set aside on appeal pursuant to a 
Rule 50(b) motion based insufficiency of the evidence; it was set aside 
because an improper ruling on evidence prejudiced the defendant’s 
case. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to order a new trial was necessary 
to protect the defendant. Indeed, the defendant in Unitherm was also 
allegedly prejudiced by a jury verdict that could not legally have been 
reached given the evidence presented at trial, but a sufficiency of the 
evidence determination must first be made by the trial court because of 
its feel for the case; the idea being that the record for appeal would be 
more complete and the parties more informed of the issues on 
appeal.152 The admissibility of evidence, on the other hand, is a pure 
question of law, with which the court of appeals must regularly and 
characteristically deal.153 Indeed, in Neely v. Martin K. Eby 
Construction Co., one of the Rule 50 cases that the Supreme Court 
cites in Unitherm, the Supreme Court this is “precisely the kind of 
issue that the losing defendant below may bring to the court of appeals 
without ever moving for a new trial in the district court.”154 
Furthermore, the district court has already ruled on that question at or 
                                                 
150 See Cone, 330 U.S. at 218. 
151 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(c). In its note on the 1962 Amendment, the Advisory 
Committee points out that “[e]ven if the verdict-winner makes no motion for a new 
trial, he is entitled upon his appeal from the judgment n.o.v. not only to urge that that 
judgment should be reversed and judgment entered upon the verdict, but that errors 
were committed during the trial which at the least entitle him to a new trial.” 
152 See Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 985–86. 
153 See Neely, 386 U.S. at 327. 
154 Id. 
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before trial, thereby offsetting the need for it to reassert its ruling on a 
post-judgment motion. 
 
C. Satisfying Rule 103 Alone Is Enough to Preserve Evidentiary Error 
for Appeal 
 
If an appellant satisfies Rule 103(a)(2), a court of appeals has the 
power to review that party’s claim of error and to order a new trial 
where the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights.155 This is the 
case even if the appellant did not move for a new trial after entry of 
the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.156 Unitherm and its forerunners do 
not prohibit this result because the trial court’s unique feel for the case 
does not give it any special advantage in dealing with evidentiary 
questions, and therefore the court could not add anything to the record 
that would benefit the reviewing court on appeal. Furthermore, the 
Advisory Committee Note on the 2000 amendment to Rule 103(a) 
implicitly shows that the Supreme Court does not consider giving the 
trial court an opportunity to correct its previous mistakes as important 
as allowing the court to rule on the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
before the jury.157 
By amending Rule 103(a) to its current language, the Supreme 
Court rejected the approach taken by some courts of appeals that all 
losing parties must renew an unsuccessful motion in limine in order to 
preserve a claim of error for appeal.158 These courts often referred to, 
                                                 
155 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 103(a). 
156 See Fuesting v. Zimmer (Fuesting II), 448 F.3d. 936, 941–42 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
157 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 
Amendment, with Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1997). 
158 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment 
(citing Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980) for requiring such a 
requirement as opposed to the amendment, which only requires the losing party to 
renew its objection when the trial court does not make a definitive ruling on the 
record). 
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among other reasons for such a requirement,159 the importance of 
giving “the trial judge an opportunity to reconsider his in limine ruling 
with the benefit of having been witness to the unfolding events at 
trial.”160 But the amended Rule 103(a) recognizes that some motions 
in limine need not be renewed at trial because many pretrial 
evidentiary rulings involve pure questions of law that cannot be 
decided with any greater accuracy in the heat of trial.161 That is not to 
say, though, that a losing party never has an incentive to renew his 
pretrial objection for the sake of preserving his prospects for appeal. 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Old Chief v. United States, a 
definitive advance ruling is reviewed in light of the facts and 
circumstances before the trial court at the time of the ruling.162 
Therefore, an appellant will want to renew its motion for a new trial 
based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling if the relevant facts and 
circumstances change materially after the advance ruling has been 
made.163 
 In light of these considerations in crafting the amendment to Rule 
103(a), it is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended that a post-
judgment motion be a prerequisite to seeking a new trial on appeal 
based on a claim of a prejudicially erroneous evidentiary ruling, 
because the appellate process would gain very little from such a strict 
requirement. The only benefit is that such a rule affords the trial court 
an opportunity to correct the errors that he made previously, at or 
before trial.164 If, given that opportunity, the judge reverses his prior 
prejudicial rulings, he would order a new trial, and an appeal would 
have been avoided. However, the potentially highly prejudicial 
                                                 
159 Another popular reason is to discourage parties “from refraining from 
making an objection at trial in order to reserve an opportunity to assert reversible 
error on appeal.” United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1987); see 
James J. Duane, Appellate Review of in Limine Rulings, 182 F.R.D. 666 (1999). 
160 Duane, supra note 159 (quoting Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730, 
734 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
161 See Duane, supra note 159. 
162 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
163 FED. R. EVID. 103, Advisory Committee Note for 2000 Amendment. 
164 See Marceaux, 124 F.3d at 734. 
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consequences of such a rigid procedural rule vastly outweigh this 
slight benefit. The resulting injustice of denying relief to the verdict 
loser is unacceptable where the evidentiary error by the trial court 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
 In a situation where the appellant has satisfied Rule 103(a), he has 
stated specific grounds for his objection and the judge has definitively 
ruled on the objection on the record.165 Where the evidentiary 
objection does not draw anymore force from the specific context in 
which it is made at trial, the trial court’s reasoning for ruling the way it 
did before trial will remain unchanged. Hence, a renewed objection 
would be unnecessary, and a motion for a new trial based on that same 
object would be similarly redundant. A reassertion of the trial court’s 
pretrial ruling would add nothing of value to the record. In contrast, a 
Rule 59 motion is required when the appellant seeks a new trial on 
appeal based on excessive or inadequate damages, because the trial 
judge must be given an opportunity to exercise his discretion.166 
Unlike an evidentiary ruling, though, the trial judge cannot rule on the 
legal adequacy of damages until after the jury returns its verdict, so the 
necessity of a post-verdict motion is obvious.  
As a result, the reviewing court can rule on the question of law on 
the basis of a complete record. It then can engage in a harmless error 
analysis.167 If the court deems the error to have prejudiced the 
appellant and the appellant did not move after the verdict for judgment 
as a matter of law based on sufficiency of the evidence (excluding that 
erroneously admitted), the only possible relief the court could grant is 
a new trial. An initial determination by the trial court of whether to 
grant a new trial is completely unnecessary and does not aid the court 
of appeals in any way. The only appropriate response to a motion for a 
new trial where evidence that affected the outcome of a trial should 
not have been presented is to grant the motion. A denial by the trial 
court would be reversed under the most deferential standard of review. 
                                                 
165 See FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
166 See Ryen v. Owens, 446 F.2d 1333, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Baker v. Dillon, 
389 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1968). 
167 See 28 U.S.C. 2111. 
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 If presented with the opportunity, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
not extend Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich to require an 
appellant to file a post-verdict motion when it seeks a new trial on 
appeal based on the trial court’s allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling. 
The Unitherm decision should properly be restricted to those cases in 
which the verdict-loser requests that judgment be entered in its favor 
given the legal insufficiency of the evidence, because, as this Note has 
demonstrated, review of the sufficiency of the evidence and harmless 
error review are two distinct assessments. Furthermore, the Court’s 
Rule 50 jurisprudence does not merely focus on the trial court’s “feel” 
for the case but more specifically on how that first-hand experience 
places it in a unique position to decide whether to grant judgment as a 
matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. Rule 50 affords the trial 
court great discretion in deciding which of these orders better 
promotes justice given the unique circumstances of each case. In 
contrast, the appellant only appealing for a new trial based on trial 
court error does not deny the trial court an opportunity to exercise this 
discretion but merely presents a pure question of law, with which 
courts of appeal characteristically deal. 
 That is not to say that the judicial system does not benefit from 
such an appellant renewing its motion for judgment as a matter of law 
after the verdict and, in the alternative, requesting a new trial based on 
evidentiary error. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit pointed at, this is the 
“better practice” that attorneys should follow, because it serves the 
purpose of Rule 50 by speeding litigation and preventing unnecessary 
retrials.168 However, in circumstances like those in Fuesting, appellate 
courts should recognize that speedy litigation is a small sacrifice to 
ensure overall fairness to parties whose substantial rights were 
affected by the trial court’s error. 
 
                                                 
168 See Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. (Fuesting II), 448 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 
2006); see also supra note 52. 
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